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ABSTRACT  
Drawing on research with people who inject drugs in London, UK, this article will explore how 
participants conceived of pleasure, and try to understand some of the tensions that ensued. 
There is a strong sense in participants’ accounts that drug use is at points pleasurable but it 
should not, or rather, could not be conceived of in this way. As such, the article will reflect on 
several situations in which pleasure came up during fieldwork but was quickly redirected 
towards addiction using terms such as ‘denial’. Trying to make sense of this seemingly 
paradoxical dynamic, in which pleasure can be addictive, but addiction cannot be pleasurable, 
I turn to some of the practices that actively keep pleasure and addiction apart, indeed, in some 
areas of the addiction sciences, antithetical. That is, a singular account of pleasure is produced 
as freely chosen (of the ‘free’ subject) in opposition to the determined nature of addiction (of 
the automated brain or object). These realities materialise in participants’ accounts, but due to 
their constructed nature they also collapse and multiply. This ‘hybridisation’ is what Bruno 
Latour refers to as the paradox of the Moderns. Considering pleasure, however, as both natural 
and cultural, it is better conceived of as always in tension, expressed by participants as ‘mixed 
feelings’, ‘love/hate’, ‘sweet and sour’, ‘good things and bad things’. Against a backdrop of 
neglect, especially within the context of injecting drug use, such conceptualisation can help 
acknowledge pleasure where it is least conceivable and yet perhaps has the most to offer. 
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Conceiving of addicted pleasures: a ‘modern’ paradox  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Once labelled ‘the great unmentionable’ (Moore & Valverde, 2000, c.f. Hunt & Evans, 2008), 
pleasure for many in the ‘West’, including for drug researchers, health practitioners, policy-
makers, as well as the media, has been hard to conceive of in relation to illicit drug use (Treloar 
& Holt, 2008; Ritter 2014), especially using ‘addictive’ drugs such as heroin and crack cocaine 
(Pienaar et al., 2015), and further still injecting these substances (Dwyer, 2008; valentine & 
Fraser, 2008). This article, however, seeks to explore where pleasure gets discussed (or not) by 
participants in a study looking at experiences and practices of injecting drug use and how 
participants make sense of pleasure in a way that might lead to its wider inclusion in the drug 
and addictions field. A distinctly ‘modern’ (Latour, 1993) refrain to pleasure is identified, 
based on the separation of nature and culture: where pleasure is associated with the ‘free’ world 
of subjects, addiction is associated with the realm of objects and the ‘determined brain’. The 
two become antithetical, which makes pleasure, within a context of ‘addictive’ drug use, hard 
to exist. In this sense, what is usually considered as ontological becomes political, and several 
sociomaterial practices take place to maintain pleasure’s absence. The possibility of pleasure 
lies in negating these poles: pleasure/addiction, object/subject, nature/culture. This article 
therefore explores the ways that ‘addiction’ and ‘pleasure’ co-exist in participants’ accounts, 
always in tension. By re-framing pleasure away from ‘freedom’, the article suggests that wider 
discussions and possibilities for how drugs get experienced (which can include pleasure among 
other affects) can take place in drug treatment practice and policy.  
 
BACKGROUND  
According to O’Malley and Valverde (2004), the absence of pleasure in drug research has a 
long political history based on controlling drug users. They argue this is due to the perceived 
threat that drug users pose to neoliberal ideals of autonomy and choice. In this sense, pleasure 
for some drug researchers and practitioners has served as a useful tool in re-rationalising drug 
use, but this allows for only a very specific kind of pleasure (based on autonomy and choice), 
which could be neglecting quieter, more subjugated forms. 
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O’Malley and Valverde suggest that since the eighteenth century 
discourses of ‘pleasure’ have been linked to discourses of reason and freedom, so that 
problematic drug consumption appears both without reason (for example ‘bestial’) and unfree 
(for example ‘compulsive’), and thus not as ‘pleasant’. (2004: 25)  
O’Malley and Valverde (2004), like much of the work on the neglect of pleasure in the 
sociology of drug use, draw on Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’. Foucault uses 
‘governmentality’ to explain a decentralisation of power occurring in the ‘West’ during the 
eighteenth century in which localised ‘technologies of power’ started to produce self-
governable citizens (Foucault, 2007). The concept has since been developed by Nikolas Rose 
in relation to the neoliberal consumer society, which is seen to be based on ‘government 
through freedom’ (Rose, 1999: xxiii). Expanding on this further, in a joint paper by Rose, 
O’Malley and Valverde (2006), this is the idea that we are not controlled through an 
impingement of our freedoms, but rather, paradoxically, through an obligation of freedom – 
‘subjects [are] required to be free and [are] required to conduct themselves responsibly, to 
account for their own lives and their vicissitudes in terms of their freedom’ (ibid: 90-91). 
Within this framework, drug use is seen to be without ‘freedom’, without ‘rationality’, and 
consequently without ‘pleasure’ (O’Malley and Valverde, 2004).  
Pleasure, especially as in the figure of the felicity calculus, is at the heart of liberal constructions 
of the rational and free subject. Pleasure and rationality are foundationally linked, precisely 
because the pleasure/pain couple is a given in the liberal constitution of rational calculation. 
For Rose (2000), drug users ‘are problematic because they throw into question the very 
presuppositions of moral consciousness, self-control and self-advancement through legitimate 
consumption upon which governmental regimes of freedom depend’ (2000: 321). Therefore, 
drug users need to be controlled, and hence Reith (2004) observes a paradox in contemporary 
society where ‘values of freedom, autonomy and choice have been accompanied by a vitiation 
of freedom, an undermining of agency and a lack of choice characterised by a number of 
addictive states’ (2004: 283). That is, those that are deemed unable to manage their own choices 
and perhaps more importantly ‘risks’ are subjected to various disciplining technologies. For 
O’Malley and Valverde, this has meant that drugs’ pleasures have been replaced by ‘craving’: 
More recently the compulsion of ‘addiction’, thought to be located in certain brain processes, 
has been joined by what ostensibly appears to be a proxy for pleasure – as ‘craving’ has taken 
the place of other ‘impelling’ forces. (2004: 34) 
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For many working in the sociology of drug use, this has made re-rationalising drugs’ 
pleasures a popular way of de-pathologising drug users. For example, Pennay (2012) 
challenges ‘media and public health discourses which construct drug users as uncontrolled, 
irrational, irresponsible, and disorderly’ (2012: 419), in demonstrating, instead, how 
participants ‘regulated and ordered their bodies during sessions of alcohol and party-drug use’ 
(2012: 417). In highlighting the intentionality behind intoxication, a number of terms have 
evolved to rationalise the pleasures found in alcohol and other drug use, such as, ‘determined 
drunkenness’, (Measham, 2006; Hutton, 2012), ‘calculated hedonism’ (Brain, 2000; 
Featherstone, 1991, Szmigin et al., 2008), and more recently ‘functional fun’ (Askew, 2016). 
But is more rationality what we need? And how might this be excluding those forms of pleasure 
that are not so easily rationalised, and those people experiencing pleasure in drug use that could 
be described as more dependent?   
Schnuer (2013) has criticised research on drug use for focusing on ‘rational choice’ 
theories, and more specifically for focusing on pleasure as a purposive and consciously chosen 
motive for action. Schnuer (2013) argues that this neglects a form of pleasure ‘without aims 
and intentions’, what he calls ‘overwhelming pleasure’. He draws on a ‘moderate reading’ of 
George Bataille who ‘attaches great meaning to the absence of the pursuit of something 
meaningful’ (2013: 263). For instance, Bataille’s concept of Sovereignty is defined in 
opposition to the ‘modern term, where ‘“letting go of control” [was replaced with] “being in 
control” as the basis of autonomy’, and instead defines it as the ‘capacity to lose oneself, to 
disconnect oneself from the constraints of choice’ (2013: 263). Schnuer argues that this 
introduces us to an idea of ‘pleasure’ as neither rational nor irrational but ‘arational’, that is, 
‘disinterested in rationality’. This has a powerful potential for being able to transcend the 
dichotomy of the ‘rational mind’ and ‘irrational body’ in researching the bodily and excessive 
side of pleasure – permitting ‘an immoderate, undisciplined, and arational pleasure to be 
positive’ (2013: 264).  
Extending an idea of pleasure beyond the rational, Weinberg considers the agency of 
the body through its context 
wherein the pleasurability of drug effects is not a neurological fait accompli but derives to a 
considerable extent from perceptions of a felicitous fit between drug effects and the practical 
demands of specific situations. (2013: 178)  
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This fits into Weinberg’s (2002) larger intellectual project calling for the recognition of 
embodied addiction in which ‘learning occurs not only through symbolically mediated 
interpretive work, but through embodied forms of collaborative practice as well’ (2002: 14). In 
his most recent paper, Latour’s (2004) notion of the body as ‘learning to be affected’ is applied 
to illuminate  
the lived realities of embodiment by revealing the body as not only the mechanical medium 
through which our minds learn but an intrinsically developing and learning faculty in its own 
right. (Weinberg, 2013: 177)  
Weinberg’s approach also shares similarities with Duff’s recent move from ‘context’ 
(2008) to ‘assemblage’ (2012; 2013; 2014), in which pleasure is seen as one of many e/affects 
enacted in the specific coming together of ‘diverse objects, spaces, actors [human and 
nonhuman] and affects’ (Duff, 2012: 145). Duff’s work is important here for developing a 
relational approach to pleasure which ontologically disrupts any notion of rationality.  
Singling out one actor in this network – such as the consuming subject – without acknowledging 
the agency of the myriad additional actors involved in this consumption merely reinforces the 
quaint dogma of rational choice. (Duff, 2012: 155) 
The relationality of drug effects, such as pleasure, is reflected in his research participants’ 
narratives on ecstasy:  
Implicit in these narratives is an affective and relational account of the phenomenology of 
ecstasy use, one that downplays the material properties of the substance itself in highlighting 
the relational construction of drug-related pleasures. (Duff, 2012: 153, original emphasis)  
In this sense, alcohol and other drugs are ‘not the same thing from one network to another, or 
from one event of consumption to another’ (Duff, 2013: 169). Therefore, drugs do not cause 
pleasure, and people do not choose pleasure, but it is made in these contexts. 
Interestingly, these ‘overwhelming’, embodied and relational forms of pleasure are 
often less communicable, that is, for Schnuer, ‘pleasure that is without need, without motive 
and without clear function, is hard to articulate and, therefore, barely accessible to discourses 
dealing with addiction or problematic use’ (2013: 266, original emphasis). This 
incommunicable side of pleasure that exceeds or precedes words is supported in various 
empirical studies (e.g. MacLean, 2008; Nettleton et al., 2011). In his study of club spaces, Duff 
(2008) says ‘what is perhaps most striking about research respondents’ accounts of the various 
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sensory pleasures associated with the use of illicit drugs is the difficulty most had articulating 
the precise nature and experience of these pleasures’ (2008: 389). Demant summarises this 
issue more generally in stating that ‘when studying bodily experience like taking drugs... it is 
hard for the actors to verbalise what is going on’ (2009: 31). 
It is against this backdrop that the study at hand employed new kinds of methods to 
attune to these quieter and often more subjugated forms of pleasure that are less consciously 
and cognitively accessible and thus communicable and conceivable.     
 
AIMS AND METHODS  
This article draws on a qualitative research project in London, UK that sought to explore 
experiences of injecting drug use, with a particular interest in pleasure as a neglected area of 
research in the sociology of drug use and harm reduction. The project used a ‘montage’ of 
methods, including ‘creative’ interviews with people who inject drugs, participant observation 
over a six month period at a community drug service, and in-depth interviews with staff 
members in various areas and positions of drug service provision across three London 
boroughs1. Although this paper focuses on the former interview accounts, it is important to 
note that the wider methodology informed the direction and sensibility of the research and 
analysis. Through these methods, a subtle practice of ‘noticing’ is used to account for the 
quieter modes of pleasure as outlined above.   
For the creative interviews, thirty participants were recruited through posters and word 
of mouth at two community drug services in different parts of the city (chosen for their higher 
concentrations of injecting drug use) 2. This included twenty men and ten women, aged between 
28-60 years old, from a range of social and ethnic backgrounds. Fifteen participants currently 
                                                          
1 Ethical approval was granted by the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Ethics Committee (ref. 
7039) and the National Health Service Regional Ethics Committee (ref. 14/LO/0184). 
2 Notably, because I also recruited via word of mouth, not all participants were ‘in treatment’ at these services. 
Treatment for heroin in the UK context usually refers to receiving an opiate substitute prescription and 
psychosocial support in the form of key work, delivered by a ‘substance misuse practitioner’, or newly re-
labelled ‘recovery worker’, at a community, mostly third-sector run, drug and alcohol service. There are 
residential detox and rehabilitation facilities but these have a more lengthy and competitive referral process due 
to the higher cost implications. The sites I used for recruitment were community drug services that offered 
substitute prescribing, key working, counselling and harm reduction services such as a needle exchange and 
onsite nurse appointments for wound care.  
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(defined as within 4 weeks) injected heroin (six also smoked crack cocaine), thirteen injected 
heroin with crack cocaine (‘speedball’) and two injected pharmaceutical heroin or 
diamorphine. The interviews lasted approximately 1.5 hours and participants were reimbursed 
£15 for their time and travel costs.  
These interviews centred on the embodied experiences and practices of injecting drug 
use and harm reduction. Keen to explore the less communicable aspects of pleasure and other 
affects, I asked participants to draw their bodies on an A1 piece of paper and map out what 
they would be feeling and doing, and what would be going on around them before, during and 
after using drugs (see also Dennis, 2016a, 2016b, 2017). A practice of ‘noticing’ was employed 
to pick up on those aspects that get communicated beyond word or sound (listening and 
language) and drawing (seeing) in enlarging a sense of what is it to be a research subject, that 
is to say, I tried to use a fuller notion of my senses, attuned to affect, in realising new modes 
on subjectivity and experience. In Ordinary Affects, Stewart (2007) introduces ‘noticing’ as a 
method for getting closer to the sensations, intensities and textures through which ordinary life 
is experienced (Coleman and Ringrose, 2013: 4). I use it here to refer to a methodological 
alertness to bodies – an entanglement of bodies, human (e.g. mine, participants’) and nonhuman 
(e.g. research materials) – in producing the bodies and experiences that are eventually made 
knowable in this research.  
The interviews are described as ‘creative’ following Mason’s (2010) coining of the term 
to describe interviews that produce additional data to the spoken word. But they also have 
another meaning, more in line with Lury and Wakeford’s (2012) methodology of ‘invention’, 
in which research is also creative through the realities it enacts. It is in this sense that I employ 
‘montage’ over more usual descriptions of combining methods via triangulation (to reach a 
more valid account). Originating from film studies, montage is an editing technique, or ‘joining 
together of different elements in a variety of combinations’ (Suhr and Willerslev, 2013: 1), 
which disrupts a linear logic of time and space. It is extended here to account for the ‘crafting’ 
process in social research and the contingency of what gets made (Law, 2004; Coleman & 
Ringrose, 2013). 
Where the creative interviews ‘noticed’ embodied experiences of injecting drug use, 
participant observation ‘noticed’ and made other realities possible; for example, the ways 
addiction and pleasure got enabled or constrained in the drug service, in particular, through the 
material environment. The interviews with service providers sharpened this focus as workers 
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talked me through the difficulties of entertaining drugged pleasures in the service. It became 
clear that this was not a place for pleasure, and I have no doubt that, like one worker said, most 
people at the drug service ‘presenting for treatment’ had ‘forgotten how it was to enjoy their 
use’. Extending a creative and more expansive and entangled idea of method based on noticing, 
I not only bring in reflections, and stories, but other ‘ways of knowing’ or technologies of 
knowing in the form of the addiction sciences. Such technologies, or even bodies, contribute 
again to those bodies and experiences made knowable in the research, and thus although 
seemingly outside of these discussions of conceivable pleasure, they affect participants and are 
even drawn upon by participants in interesting and revealing ways.   
 
APPROACH: ‘WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN’ 
In thinking through participants’ accounts, trying to make sense of the tensions between 
pleasure and addiction, I kept coming back to Bruno Latour’s seminal text: We Have Never 
Been Modern. As its relevance gets fleshed out below using participant accounts, I will only 
briefly set up the position here. Situated in the anthropology of science, Latour concerns 
himself with the worlds of nature and culture. But rather than giving science a cultural 
interpretation, he argues that we have never made such separation. Drawing from Shapin and 
Schaffer’s ‘Leviathan and the Air Pump’, Latour examines the Modern Constitution 
bequeathed to us by thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle. 
They are like a pair of Founding Fathers, acting in concert to promote one and the same 
innovation in political theory: the representation of nonhumans belong to science, but science 
is not allowed to appeal to politics; the representation of citizens belongs to politics, but politics 
is not allowed to have any relation to the nonhumans produced and mobilized by science and 
technology. (1993: 28) 
Latour argues, however, that Shapin and Schaffer fail to do justice to the ‘genius’ of their 
comparison – Hobbes and Boyle, the Leviathan and Air Pump, politics and science –  
suggesting that they ‘submit to politics’ (1993: 25). The essential point of this Modern 
Constitution, he argues, ‘is that it renders the work of mediation that assembles hybrids 
invisible, unthinkable, unrepresentable’ (1993: 34). The work of purification – nature – must 
remain separate from the work of mediation – society (1993: 32). Taking up this ‘lost 
opportunity’, Latour sets about redrawing or rather removing this line between politics and 
science, the human and nonhuman, culture and nature. The new constitution is to be built on 
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hybrids – quasi-objects (like the missed opportunity of the air-pump) and quasi-subjects. He 
seeks to explore how hybrids get purified, or made as ‘single’. For me, this speaks to the 
relationship between drugged pleasures as freely chosen, of the subject, or as automation, of 
the brain. Currently, ‘the immanence of society’ – ‘we are totally free’ – protects the 
‘transcendence of nature’ – ‘we can do nothing against Nature’s laws’. In other words, our 
notions of freedom and subjectivity protect our ideas of automation and objectivity, and thus 
‘pleasure-as-free’ helps to bring about ‘pleasure-as-automation’. But as I will go on to 
explicate, we have never been modern, and pleasure has never been free.  
 
ANALYSES  
The more we forbid ourselves to conceive of hybrids, the more possible their interbreeding 
becomes – such is the paradox of the moderns. 
Latour, 1993: 12  
 FD: So do you see it as something which is pleasurable? 
Tom: Yeah, sort of, yeah, I mean, when I was stressed out over the weekend, when I had my 
28-day ‘notice to quit’ [eviction notice] and all that, the same way that someone would come 
in and reach for the brandy or the whisky and stuff. I’m not a drinker and I find the effects of 
hangovers, I can’t really cope with, but in the same way as someone would reach for the 
whiskey bottle, I reach for the telephone and get myself a couple of bags [of heroin]. 
FD: Yeah, but, do you do that also when you’re like in a good mood, and you’re just like ahh 
that sounds like a good idea or is it always when you’re feeling stressed? 
Tom: Well, it’s my addiction, so, it’s my kind of ‘drug of choice’ so yeah it goes both ways, 
good mood and bad mood, when I’m in a good mood, I could be in a better mood if I had a 
couple of bags.  
Tom was a long-term heroin injector and recipient of the opiate substitute, methadone. Despite 
being on this medication, he continued to inject heroin. As Tom’s response highlights, in asking 
about pleasure, I was invariably met with something more complicated, and as I tried to pin 
this elusive affect down, it escaped definition. I grappled with pleasure, at different points of 
the project, as a matter of the body (somatically produced and felt), a matter of politics (its 
existence being dependent on the political context), and language (neoliberal discourses of 
10 
 
reason and rationality restrict corporeal pleasures, see Pennay, 2012). In other words, I have 
tried to understand it in social, material and discursive ways. Above, I try to attach it to 
something ‘social’ – a pleasure that can challenge the dominant discourses of addiction, one 
that is done in ‘good moods’, out of choice, as opposed to a negative conception of drug use, 
done out of compulsion. But, what I have come to realise, in listening closely to participants’ 
explanations, is that pleasure is at once all of these things, and how it emerges in these 
conceptualisation exercises elides such divisions. For Tom, pleasure cannot be disentangled 
from addiction, for it is ‘real’ (‘my addiction’), but also contingent on politics (he accounts for 
his drug use in terms of normalising it – ‘the same way as somebody would reach for the 
whiskey bottle’ – which perhaps indicates an awareness of the contentious political context of 
drug use) and language (he explicitly uses the term ‘drug of choice’, which is a common trope 
in drug services, and indicates how he has come to understand and experience his drug use 
through such discourses). In this sense, pleasure is at once ‘real, social and narrated’ (Latour, 
1993) or as Deleuze and Guattari put it, there are ‘semiotic flows, material flows, and social 
flows simultaneously’ (2004: 22). In trying to deny this hybridity, that is, in what can be seen 
as a distinctly ‘modern’ disposition towards a single explanatory frame, the complexity just 
seemed to proliferate. 
Through this, I try to make sense of another seemingly paradoxical dynamic at play in 
the research:  pleasure is addictive but addiction cannot be pleasurable. There was a strong 
feeling in the fieldwork and in people’s accounts that drug use was at points pleasurable but it 
should not, or rather, as will become clear, could not be conceived of in this way. Participants 
often spoke of the pleasures of their drug use, but then quickly followed this with a ‘but’ to 
indicate the many negative components. Participants would talk about their drug use, and 
pleasure would slip in, or participants would talk about pleasure, and addiction would force its 
way in. These verbs are carefully chosen as participants’ affective responses, when changing 
from narratives of pleasure to addiction, were often more sudden and intrusive. For example, 
in Lucy’s account (to come) she begins to get upset when negative memories suddenly surface 
(cutting her sentence off mid-flow). However, rather than viewing these positive and negative 
experiences as separate, pertaining either to pleasure or addiction, they appeared to be in 
constant tension.  
The analysis to follow tries to make sense of these tensions. First, I will reflect on a 
provocative situation that happened during the planning stages of the research, which highlights 
the extent to which pleasure was an uncomfortable interjection in the context of addictive drug 
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use. Second, I seek to understand this encounter through an exploration of how pleasure and 
addiction are being kept apart, indeed, in the addiction sciences, how they are being made as 
antithetical. I consider how a singular account of pleasure as freely chosen (of the ‘free’ subject) 
is produced in opposition to the determined nature of addiction. I will then look at how such 
realities are known in participants’ accounts, but due to their constructed nature, how they also 
collapse and multiply. A concept of freedom is key to this construct as I see it, but in a very 
different way to ‘governmentality’: instead of the paradoxical ‘governance through freedom’, 
there is a ‘modern’ (Latour, 1993) paradox, where pleasure relies on a singular account of 
subjective freedom that does not exist.  
 
‘Pleasure/addiction’ 
The antithetical relationship between addiction and pleasure started to reveal itself in a 
conversation with a manager and a group of service users during the planning stages of my 
research. Let me briefly tell this story as a way of framing what is to come.  
I was invited to present my proposal at the monthly regional service user committee to 
gain the group’s feedback and, as part of the governance of research, to gain their approval for 
the study to go ahead. The twelve members, who were seated around a large boardroom table, 
had read the research proposal in advance. The manager raised concerns, saying that the 
project’s interest in drugs’ pleasures sounded more relevant to a group of young people sitting 
around getting ‘stoned’ on cannabis than heroin or crack cocaine users in the midst of addiction, 
and this was discussed amongst the group. The Chair, who described himself as a recovering 
heroin addict, talked about how he did not know anyone who would see their drug use as 
pleasurable, and if they did, it was just a ‘superficial’ aspect, and used as a mechanism for 
denying the more underlying issues. The concept of denial, which is often used in Narcotics 
Anonymous rhetoric and psychodynamic-influenced therapies was frequently invoked (see 
Carr, 2011, for an excellent ethnographic account of the work denial does in producing 
treatment subjects). In this sense, pleasure was not a legitimate concern, or, as a concern, it was 
only worth exploring in terms of what it was deemed to be ‘covering up’. This sparked a long 
discussion about the harms that drug use had caused to the members and other people they 
knew.  
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It seemed that pleasure was just not that relevant, that is, until one man, sitting across 
from me, and waiting for a moment’s silence, suddenly interrupted, and said that as soon as 
injecting was mentioned, a ‘pleasurable sensation’, what he described as a ‘tingly’, took place 
at his old injection site. Suddenly, much to people’s surprise, pleasure had entered the room. I 
think he was trying to express the latent desire that he still feels towards his old drug use, a 
visceral response that reappears at unsuspecting moments (see also Harris, 2015). Although he 
went on to recount some of the difficulties (living in a crack house) and tiresomeness of being 
in ‘full blown addiction’, he also spoke about the excitement of those days. His response 
suggests an embodied support for the relevance of pleasure even in dependent drug use. It was 
brave of him to speak about his pleasurable embodied memories, which are often shut out 
(Harris, 2015), especially as it was also clear that other people were not going to be so receptive. 
And, indeed, his response was moved on from quickly. Pleasure undoubtedly occupied a 
difficult space and needed to be managed carefully.  
For me, this managed absence links up to the way ‘modern’ addiction sciences divide 
drug use between ‘liking’ versus ‘wanting’, in which pleasure, or rather, a lack of it, becomes 
a defining feature of addiction. Addiction, according to this theory, is a reward-system 
dysfunction. Although ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ can be linked, they are said to reside in separate 
parts of the brain and function independently: ‘wanting’ is seen as ‘incentive salience’ whilst 
‘liking’ is seen as ‘subjective pleasure’. In terms of ‘objective’ pleasure, ‘rewards may 
influence behaviour even in the absence of being consciously aware of them’ (Berridge et al., 
2010).  In other words, ‘wanting’ is a matter of automaticity, which is ‘objectively’ known (for 
example, through PET scans), beyond conscious awareness, whilst ‘liking’ is more 
‘subjectively’ and consciously known and governed. Over the course of using drugs, the 
relationship between ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’ is seen to change, with ‘wanting’ increasing and 
‘liking’ decreasing as the drug use moves from ‘casual’ to ‘compulsive’ (Berridge et al., 2010: 
16).  
The lack of freely chosen pleasure becomes a defining feature of addiction. This is 
evident in the flourishing area of research on ‘craving’ as a phenomenon of the ‘dysfunctional’ 
reward system, which is again isolated from pleasure: instead of ‘subjective’ pleasure, there is 
an ‘overstimulated’ reward system leading to ‘impaired cognitive function’ and ‘uncontrollable 
cravings’ (Nature, 2014). Therefore, to return to our unexpected encounter with pleasure in the 
service user group, an embodied pleasure entered where it did not belong. As such, it was 
carefully managed, and even I did not know how to respond. Besides acknowledging his 
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feeling, I was at a loss with what to say. There was an uneasiness about the atmosphere, which 
perhaps reaffirms at an affective level the strength of this antithetical dynamic between pleasure 
and addiction. But this is by no means a ‘natural’ distinction, as the situation also highlighted 
the proactive work being done to keep normal or ‘free’ pleasure (e.g. the social cannabis use) 
away from an ‘addictive’ pleasure – that is, we are told, ‘pleasure’ cannot really exist (‘denial’) 
for those using drugs in a ‘dependent’ way. However, ironically, these very practices of 
maintaining the divide are what also expose its fallacy. I will now try to make sense of how 
pleasure gets made as antithetical to addiction and the complexities that proliferate as a result.  
From a critical sociological perspective, this could be seen in terms of what O’Malley 
and Valverde (2004) have identified as a link between discourses of pleasure and freedom in 
the governance of drug users. A notion of freedom is central to their argument and 
governmentality more generally, which in ‘advanced liberal’ societies is said to operate 
paradoxically through freedom. As mentioned above, Nikolas Rose has written extensively on 
the matter and explores various ways that freedom is used in contemporary society to produce 
particular types of governable citizens. This work is summed up in a collaborative effort by 
Rose, O’Malley and Valverde:  
Rose (1992) argued that central to contemporary strategies for governing the soul was the 
creation of freedom. Subjects were obliged to be free and were required to conduct themselves 
responsibly, to account for their own lives and their vicissitudes in terms of their freedom. 
Freedom was not opposed to government. On the contrary, freedom, as choice, autonomy, self-
responsibility, and the obligation to maximize one’s life as a kind of enterprise, was one of the 
principal strategies of what Rose termed advanced liberal government. (2006: 90-1)  
Neoliberal pleasure is intrinsically tied up with notions of freedom, rationality and reason. It is 
within this framework that drug use is seen to be without ‘freedom’, without ‘rationality’, and 
consequently without ‘pleasure’ (O’Malley & Valverde, 2004). This chimes with Eve 
Sedgwick’s observation that ‘the object of addiction has become precisely enjoyment of “the 
ability to choose freely, and freely choose health”’ (1993: 132). By this, she means, ‘addiction’ 
has proliferated as the polar opposite of ‘free choice’ – ‘so long as “free will” has been 
hypostatised... for just so long has a hypostatised “compulsion” had to be available as a 
counterstructure always internal to it’ (1993: 134). Consequently, pleasure (as free) and 
addiction (as compulsion) emerge as antithetical. And in many ways, a categorisation of 
‘recreational’ and ‘dependent’ drug use still prominent in drug research serves to perpetuate 
this separation.  
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Therefore, in mentioning pleasure in the interviews, I had inadvertently imported and 
given voice to a notion of ‘pleasure-as-free’, which meant pleasure often got denied in light of 
addiction or accepted in recourse to recreational drug use. For example, Mike, who injects 
heroin and crack cocaine (‘speedball’), says: 
Yeah, it’s more recreational now than habitual. And for once it feels good to be able to have 
money and know that you can do it if you want to do it. If you don’t want to do it, it’s fine. I sit 
there and think to myself, I don’t get many cravings these days, thank god, but when I do, when 
I do think about it sometimes, or if someone mentions it, and I think well I haven’t used for 5 
days or over a week, you know, so why do it now, so I’m not easily lead into it, I’ll only do it 
when I want to do […]. It is more for just like a quick buzz, a quick euphoria, to have a good 
time, rather than like having to do it.  
Mike validates his pleasure through several contrasts, including ‘recreational’/‘habitual’, 
‘cravings’/‘want’, ‘want to’/‘need to’, and ‘quick buzz’ and ‘good time’/‘having to’. Pleasure 
exists in light of a certain freedom, so its demise comes about in relation to ‘obsession’ and 
being overtaken by the ‘brain’. Malik, who also injects ‘speedballs’, says:  
Pleasure does come into it, it did come into it, but I tell you now, for the last three years of so, 
no, it has not been pleasurable. There’s the obsession in me to use anyway, cos I’ve done it for 
so long, I will obsess over it. And my brain will make these lovely, I’ll remember the good bits. 
Even though the participants would meet the DSM-V (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) criteria for an ‘addictive disorder’, they often drew on the dichotomy 
between recreational and addictive drug use in distinguishing their practice as pleasure-seeking 
or within their control, rather than addiction. For example, Ajay says:  
It can be habitual, it depends how strong your soul is, like if you choose to be a waster, like 
obviously you’ve seen wasters, but, err, you’ve obviously done other interviews with other 
people, and obviously their body doesn’t look well, they don’t eat properly. There’s different 
levels [pause], I use because I want to use, not because I’m a street junkie, I use because I 
enjoy using.  
In an important text by Eduardo Viana Vargas (2010), he cautions researchers against 
asking why people use drugs due to its susceptibility to pathologised responses. ‘It’s not enough 
to ask “why do people use drugs?” and “what is the meaning of drugs?”’, which is seen to lead 
to ‘answers usually premised on “error”, “lack” or “weakness”’ (2010: 210). It is in this sense 
that I would also add a warning about how pleasure, in opposition to pathology, that is, 
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‘pleasure as free’, gets evoked in such questioning, and, as a counterpoint, can reproduce 
pathologising and stigmatising identities. For example, Ajay refers to a ‘strength of soul’, 
which is lacking in ‘street junkies’. Therefore, following Duff (2014), I have come to conclude 
that I was asking too much: 
the trouble with conventional approaches to drug use is that they ask rather too much of the 
drug user. The user bears responsibility for most of the dynamics of consumption, and 
subsequently remains culpable for any of the harm [but also pleasure] generated therein. (2014: 
142-3, parenthesis added) 
I was asking participants to reflect on something they were not entirely in control of. Indeed, 
thinking is a process that is not decided by thought alone. It is perhaps not that surprising then 
that just as easily as ‘pleasure-as-free’ came into conceptualisation it started to slip away. That 
is, the more we try to make separations, the more we generate hybrids. Following both Vargas’s 
(2010) use of Gabriel Tarde and Duff’s (2014) use of Gilles Deleuze, pleasure is not stable, but 
a matter of the drug using event, which is anything but freely chosen (Dennis, 2016; 2017). 
Therefore, in reifying the subject by asking him/her about pleasure, particular conditions were 
borne out. Of interest here is namely a dichotomy between pleasure and addiction. But in letting 
this go, or simply ‘noticing’ what was brought up in other less directed parts of the interview, 
the dichotomies started to unfold, that is, a ‘liking’ versus ‘wanting’ became unstuck, indeed, 
nonsensical. Some participants conversely talked about their ‘addictive’ drug use in terms of 
pleasure, in which, going against the dominant narrative, they continued using because of the 
pleasures rather than compulsion. For example, talking about her recent move to heroin 
injecting from smoking, Gwen says, ‘actually I’m stoned, this is nice, so it’s a bit addictive in 
that way, you want to do it again’. ‘Speedballing’ (injecting heroin and crack cocaine together), 
for most participants, was felt to be particularly enjoyable and addictive: ‘as soon as I started 
doing the speedball, I like it so much, but it makes me do one after the other after the other’ 
(Grigor). 
 Even more defiantly, ‘the addict’ was seen as a discerning pleasure-seeker, for example, 
Mike says: ‘Well, the addict inside me is happy, because I’m getting a good bit of thing [crack] 
for once’. And some of Mike’s more dangerous decisions were taken out of pleasure rather 
than ‘need’:  
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I mean when I first did my groin I didn’t need to, I weren’t in a situation where I had no veins 
left, I did, but, again, my friend was doing it and you know, I said what’s the difference and he 
said ‘oh yeah, it hits you harder, its stronger, and hits you so much quicker’. 
A similar sense of pleasure-seeking, rather than necessity or ‘need’, can be seen in Meg’s 
account of neck injecting: 
Meg: I have used my feet and I have used my neck, I’ve never used my groin ever.  
FD: Was your neck because you couldn’t find... [she pre-empted that I was going to say a vein]  
Meg: No, it wasn’t that, someone said oh you get a better hit, it goes straight to your head, and 
they did it for me, I didn’t do it on my own... It does go to your head quicker, I suppose because 
it’s nearer your brain.  
Trying to make sense of this antithetical dynamic of pleasure/addiction, as both brought into 
being and collapsed by participants, a theory of governmentality does not seem to go far 
enough. It tries to see addiction as a matter of discourse in a way that does not take the 
materiality of injecting seriously, which both neglects other parts of the drug assemblage 
(beyond discourse) and the somatic feelings enacted. For instance, Sedgwick (1993) says:   
The locus of addictiveness cannot be the substance itself and can scarcely even be the body 
itself, but must be some overarching abstraction that governs the narrative relations between 
them. (1993: 131) 
For Bunton and Coveney, these abstract tendencies are seen in relation to the wider 
dichotomous make-up of the drug field: 
Psychology and neurophysiology have developed biological foundations for emotions, 
including pleasure, as an inherently human phenomenon. Central neurological pathways are 
credited with the passage of pleasure-receiving signals, and specific parts of the brain have been 
identified as centres where pleasure is registered (Warburton, 1994). By contrast, sociologists 
have situated pleasures in time, space and specific discourses seeing pleasure as a socio-cultural 
construction. (2011: 11)  
From what I have seen, heard, and crucially, ‘noticed’ in this research, there are clear 
inadequacies in both the ‘biological’ and ‘social’ models, as both fail to cope with the 
complexities of pleasure-addiction. This has encouraged me to think again about this divide, 
going beyond governmentality, to think about ‘pleasure as freely chosen’ in another way. 
Rather than understanding ‘freedom’ in the neoliberal sense – as a paradox based on 
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‘governance through freedom’ (freedom as an overarching discourse) – I have come to consider 
‘freedom’ through a distinctly ‘modern’ paradox. Through Latour (outlined above), we have 
never made the separations between nature and culture that we so unrelentingly follow. Where 
post-modern theories have tried to eradicate such binaries in recourse to social or discursive 
construction, Latour argues that they have never existed. Even though the ‘Modern 
Constitution’ works tirelessly to make pleasure seem ‘freely chosen’ (of the subject), in 
participants’ conceptualisation, it is always tied to something more. The paradox is that the 
more we try to make these separations, the more the boundaries collapse and complexities 
proliferate.  
 
Pleasure-in-tension: ‘It’s a really lovely feeling but my god the crap that comes with it’ 
The article so far has drawn attention to how addiction and pleasure get made as antithetical, 
both in addiction sciences and drug services. But emblematic of this construction, we have also 
seen how the binary gets complicated in participants’ accounts. Whether pleasure exists for 
people to talk about is neither natural (given) nor cultural (performative), but a product of 
networks, in some more real than others. I will now look further at how these complexities 
manifest in two accounts from Lucy and Ajay, who encapsulate these tensions in different 
ways. As they move through different networks of bodies, discourses and things, different 
affects were produced. In talking about pleasure, Lucy and Ajay tried to separate out this affect 
from others, but, true to its ‘modern’ construction, this was not possible, and the complexity or 
‘crap’, to use Lucy’s term, multiplied. This brings about a tension in which talking about 
pleasure becomes difficult, not because it does not exist (in absolute terms) or does not belong 
(in a governmentality sense), but because it is always in the process of becoming something 
else (i.e. caught in a network, which, with the slightest change, produces different affects). 
Pleasure is most literally in tension. I quote Lucy’s words in full, as the vibrancy and nuance 
of the account would be lost if paraphrased. 
Lucy: ...But then I slipped back into gear because it was, it’s a really weird mistress, or whatever 
they say, you just think you can leave it and I hope to beat it one day, but it’s something that, 
unfortunately, it does do what it says. It does wrap you up in cotton wool. 
FD: Can you tell me a bit more about these feelings? 
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Lucy: Well the first time I took it, it is orgasmic, I felt like I was floating on the bed. Like, it 
was, because he [her partner] started before me, he was quite cross, ‘you’ve got that first 
feeling’, and getting really jealous. And I thought ‘oh my god’ (rolling her eyes back, 
suggesting an overwhelming pleasure)... but I don’t want to advertise it, I’m just saying... but 
that’s what you’re chasing. But then, when it comes to, what’s so dangerous about it, it’s weird 
because my sister was very good at the beginning because she had a boyfriend who was very 
much into heroin and she was so scared for me, she was like please don’t go into that extent, 
and of course you lie to people and say ‘oh I’m not’, but I was holding down jobs and (stops 
suddenly). But even though I keep talking about the good side of it, I have such (starts to 
stutter/quiver), as soon as I think about it, I have such mixed feelings about it, it’s a really lovely 
feeling but my god the crap that comes with it, the stress of getting the money, going to the 
(cuts off), hiding the secret, taking something, having a hit in the toilet, not having gear, going 
home dripping, trying to hold down a job where you’re hallucinating because you’re 
withdrawing and pouring with sweat, and someone saying can you fax this and you’re just 
thinking I want to go, I want to go, but once you’re comfortable at home and you’ve got all 
your paraphernalia, it’s lovely. [my emphases]    
To reiterate, Lucy says, ‘as soon as I start thinking about it, I have such mixed feelings, it’s a 
really lovely feeling but my god the crap that comes with it’. She then elaborates on some of 
this ‘crap’. For me, this highlights the difficulties participants found in separating out not only 
the more immediate feelings from the more lasting, the bodily from the social, but also, more 
importantly for this article, the enacted from the conceived. This is not because they are 
separate but precisely because they emanate together. There is something in the conceiving 
itself which puts pleasure in tension – ‘as soon as I start thinking about it’ –in which it is 
attached to addiction discourses, painful withdrawals, social stigma etc. As mentioned above, 
thinking is the effect of forces that are not decided by thought alone. Instead of starting with 
any ‘singular’ forms of addiction (as compulsion) or pleasure (as free), let us attend to the 
networks in Lucy’s, and another participant, Ajay’s accounts that produce these thoughts, and 
thus what this could say more widely about how people come to think about pleasure in drug 
using practices, and how this could enable alternative (and more positive) ways of thinking, 
talking and ultimately, doing drugs.  
For Lucy, as she describes above, it is in being caught up in networks of physical 
dependency, changing family dynamics and negative social attitudes that things become 
‘dangerous’. More specifically, it is in lying to her family, ‘hiding the secret [of using]’, ‘the 
stress of getting the money’, ‘having a hit in the toilet’, ‘withdrawing and pouring with sweat’ 
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and ‘trying to hold down a job’. The sweat, toilet, and fax machine are particularly prominent 
and powerful actors. The discourses connected to the toilet means that having to use it for 
anything other than its purpose is highly stigmatised. Sweating is attached to a particularly 
gendered discourse of shame. And the fax machine affords an office (and arguably gendered) 
professionalism that Lucy is struggling to conform to. But once she is at home with her 
paraphernalia, it’s ‘lovely’. As these networks change, from the toilet-sweat-fax machine to 
the syringe-home-heroin, Lucy’s feelings change and hence, on reflection, they begin to 
overlap and coalesce. This reflects Annemarie Mol’s sentiment that ‘as actors come to 
participate in different “networks”, discourses, logics, modes of ordering, practices, things get 
complex’ (2010: 260). Lucy tries to separate (in line with the Modern Constitution) thought 
from the world, past from the present, and bodily from the social, but this is not possible and 
causes tension. To revisit Latour, and Deleuze and Guattari, everything is at once material, 
social and political.  
These tensions are further seen in Ajay’s account, which are highlighted in the changing 
position of the drug, heroin, from ‘golden brown’ to a ‘brown bitch’. Like in Lucy’s account, 
Ajay starts off by conceiving of heroin in terms of pleasure, but it quickly becomes about more 
(or less). Using the body mapping to tell his story, I asked, in referring to his drug use, ‘and 
then how does that make your body feel?’, and Ajay replied, ‘Right…shall I do another one 
[body map]? He explains that his first picture (right hand side of Figure I) would be before 
using drugs: ‘so this is before: ‘waiting for your dealer’. ‘And this new one is about?’ ‘After, 
this would be, “after”, “under the influence” – how do you spell “influence”?’ He then started 
writing some song lyrics (left hand side of Figure 1), and said: ‘It’s true – have you heard it – 
golden brown, texture like sun, brings [lays] me down with my masheeba [mind she runs], 
throughout the night, no need to fight, never a frown with golden brown’. With this, he 
suddenly relaxed back into his chair and started singing the song with his eyes half shut, 
swaying slightly from side to side. This provoked some laughter between us, and after 
confirming that I knew the song, he continued to sing, that is, before, much like with Lucy’s 
account, another affect made itself known: 
dud dud dud dud dud dud, dud dud dud dud dud dud (singing and swaying to the keyboard 
vamps in 3/4 bar).  Right, or, I call her my brown (stops himself to explain), obviously it’s a 
love/hate relationship with drug use… I call her a (pause) brown bitch, to be honest, because 
obviously she causes you so much pain but you still go running back to her, it’s like a woman 
that makes you feel good when you’re around her, she makes you feel good, but if you’re 
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without her, you’re love sick, you’re sick as a dog, you can’t function without her, you’re cold, 
you’re sneezing, yeah, but when she’s around you, you feel happy and when she’s, like, when 
you’re under the influence and you’re wrapped around her, all you think about is her and you’re 
happy to be in contact with her, but when she leaves you, you’re love sick and you’ll do 
anything, you’ll do anything to get the feeling back, but yeah, heroin is a woman that treats me 
bad, but I still love her (emphasis put on this). Do you understand?  
 
 
Figure III: Ajay’s body map. (Jay is a psuedynym)  
 
Ajay’s account vividly highlights some of the complexities caught up in participants’ 
feelings towards their drug use. He began by describing the feeling of heroin through the song 
lyrics and rhythms of ‘golden brown’ and affectively re-enacts the pleasures of being ‘under 
the influence’. But then, like Lucy, he suddenly stops, as if again being cut off, and says, ‘right’. 
This again gives us the sense that thoughts are not our own – the pleasurable memories escape 
him (perhaps, to use the worker’s statement briefly mentioned above, he has ‘forgotten how it 
was to enjoy [his] use’), and he starts to remember the bad side, or in Lucy’s terms, ‘the crap’. 
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For Ajay, this is namely the role of dependency, which he personifies as ‘girlfriend-like’, 
perhaps to communicate an agency that is otherwise, in a ‘modern’ separation of objects and 
subjects, hard to explain (a device also used by others). Drawing on this agency, he poetically 
tells me about his conflict with the substance he loves but causes him so much pain.  
 The idea that pleasure can live outside the ‘crap’ makes little sense; instead it moves 
through networks, in ‘passing’ (Gomart & Hennion, 1999). This ‘passing’ means it is always 
caught between affects. For example, some participants said there was not any pleasure in their 
drug use, it was purely ‘addiction’, and then they realised there was also pleasure. Others, like 
in Ajay’s account, started off thinking about their drug use as simply pleasure-oriented – earlier 
in the interview Ajay said ‘I use drugs because I enjoy using drugs that’s the only reason I do 
use drugs’– but then realised there was also ‘pain’. Conceiving of pleasure is hard because it is 
more often than not in passing, caught within networks and between affects as ‘mixed feelings’ 
(Lucy) and ‘love/hate relationship’ (Ajay), but also captured by other participants as ‘sweet 
and sour’ and ‘good things and bad things’. By disrupting pleasure as free, we have been able 
to explore its more complicated and hidden forms. Next I turn to what this might mean for drug 
policy and intervention.  
 
DISCUSSION  
Where pleasure is becoming increasingly acceptable to talk about in relation to ‘recreational’ 
drug use, for example, the Global Drug Survey (the largest online drug survey) in 2013 
introduced the first Net Pleasure Index, it is arguably becoming no more acceptable in relation 
to ‘dependent use’, for example, this Index notably excludes heroin and crack cocaine. In fact, 
a discourse of pleasure based on freedom could be making pleasure even less possible to 
discuss and exist among certain users, which could serve to inadvertently marginalise those 
involved in more complicated forms of drugged pleasures. Worryingly, these are likely to be 
those drug users that are already the most stigmatised. Therefore, I have argued, through 
participant accounts, for another way of understanding pleasure, as nearly always in tension, 
belonging neither to nature nor society, caught up in sociomaterial networks and between 
affects. By making pleasure more possible in these tightly managed contexts (e.g. the drug 
service), there is the potential to unleash many new ways of knowing, experiencing and also 
intervening with drugs.   
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With a commitment to making better drug realities, a more complicated understanding 
of pleasure has uses in relation to recent phenomenon such as ‘chemsex’, where pleasure has 
been dealt with in constrained and constraining (stigmatising) ways (Race, 2015). A wider 
sense of ‘pleasure-in-tension’ can help acknowledge and engage with some of these most 
stigmatised forms of pleasure, enabling drug practitioners to talk more openly about these ways 
of experiencing drugs, which may help service users not only feel more understood, and thus 
willing to seek the support they need, but also enact more positive outcomes. A more 
complicated conception of pleasure allows for the ambivalence and ambiguity people often 
find in their using, both wanting to and not wanting to use. Rather than trying to purify these 
tensions, for example, in a cost/benefit analysis typical of the Cognitive Behavioural Therapy-
informed techniques employed in UK drug services (DoH, 2007), workers can learn to hold 
onto them at the same time. That is, navigating harm reduction or treatment pathways in light 
of these tensions and conflicts, rather than trying to separate and privilege one (the ‘costs’) 
over the other (‘benefits’). In a UK context, where treatment goals are increasingly defined by 
abstinence, such an understanding of pleasure will heighten an appreciation for the difficulties 
people have in holding only/mainly negative attitudes towards their drug use and making 
‘choices’ to give them up (see also Mol, 2008 for a critique of choice-based care). This will 
make interventions such as heroin maintenance treatment seem less problematic as strategies 
that enact pleasure and addiction, drug and medicine, and drug user and patient. 
Even in a harm reduction context, a recognition of pleasure highlights that technologies 
such as opiate substitution are not always enough in enabling safer practices. Where substances 
like methadone and buprenorphine deal with the physical symptoms of dependency and 
withdrawal, they cope less well with the other aspects of drug use, such as, the practices and 
pleasures. This recognition may even question the limits of harm reduction strategies such as 
supervised injecting clinics that carefully sanitise spaces. Rather than trying to manage such 
affects, harm reduction can tap into or ‘harness’ these aspects (Harris & Rhodes, 2012). For 
instance, a sociomaterial take on pleasure gestures to the importance of the material 
environment, where certain experiences are afforded more or less than others. This may mean 
re-organising drug service spaces, and even harm reduction technologies, such as opiate 
substitution treatment (OST) regimes (e.g. Fraser & valentine, 2008; Harris & Rhodes, 2013) 
and substances (e.g. Dennis, 2017), and more recently injecting packs (Fraser et al, under 
review), with an awareness to what gets produced. This is a move marked by a shift away from 
freedom based on autonomy. As Emile Gomart famously argued in relation to methadone, 
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‘human agency is tentatively and temporarily re-defined as the capacity not to act alone, but 
[...] to act because one was generously constrained’ (2002: 546). Following this, Harris and 
Rhodes argue for a more ‘generous’ OST strategy, which could enable people to ‘manage their 
drug use, prevent withdrawal, cement social relationships, and inadvertently protect against 
hepatitis C transmission’ (2013: 1). Fraser et al (under review) have also recently gone a step 
further in developing a new ‘fitpack’ prototype for couples, which they suggest can afford care 
and responsibility. 
As researchers, practitioners and policy makers committed to the principles of harm 
reduction, we need to be thinking about ways to make pleasure and the other more hidden 
positive aspects of drug use more possible, that is, to produce more good affects in reducing 
bad affects, or more radically, to reduce bad affects in producing good affects. I have argued  
that one way to do this is in conceiving of pleasure in tension and so more complicated forms 
become knowable in research, practice and policy, which works to include rather than exclude 
people who inject drugs or use in ways commonly described as ‘problematic’, ‘dependent’ or 
‘chaotic’ (often seen to be indicative of an addiction).  
 
CONCLUSION  
This article has shown how pleasure and addiction are produced as distinct. As a result, casting 
pleasure as freely chosen is highlighted as a modern project that relies on a separation of the 
social from the material, but, as predicted by Latour, despite these purification efforts, these 
divides started to elide. And as the antithetical dynamic of pleasure/addiction started to show 
itself up in this way (as a modern paradox), I was able to understand some of the complexities 
of what participants were telling me in a way that did not rely on such purifications. Pleasure 
was never conceived alone but rather always in tension with other affects. It is in these tensions 
that a wider recognition of pleasure in the drugs field is proposed. Importantly, this is one that 
allows for the pleasures experienced by people who are usually dismissed as addicted. Through 
a more inclusive, yet fraught conception, pleasure is not only more conceivable but also more 
possible (ontologically). Thus, not only are different kinds of policy and treatment 
conversations that look at the positive aspects of drug use as well as the harms made 
imaginable, but we can also be involved in bringing these aspects further into being through 
our interventions.  
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